Presumption flows neg: a) Statements are more often false than true because proving any part of a claim as untrue or questioning assumptions renders the entire statement untrue. b) Just as we wouldn’t assume an ethical framework without justification, don’t assume that normativity is valid without proof. c) The aff gets to speak first and last meaning they have a clear advantage on issues of framework and 1AR theory. Both sides get 13 minutes meaning aff appeals to time skew are irrelevant. d) “Resolved” implies that there’s strong support for the resolution placing the burden of proof on the aff, absent this you negate.

Next, negate means ‘to invalidate’ (Oxford American Dictionary), so I can invalidate the resolution in a number of ways via my interpretation of the resolution or sufficient answers to the affirmative case. No burden in the AC can constrain how I reach a negative ballot. Prefer my interpretation because it’s textually consistent with the definitions of the words we’re given to guide our actions in debate. Textuality is key to fairness since it’s the basis for pre-round preparation.

Ought implies a moral obligation so I value morality. Moral statements are expressions of our emotive state in describing our feelings toward a particular issue.

**Ayer**, (Alfred Jules, Language, Truth, and Logic: Critique of Ethics and Theology, p. 107-112, 1946, JD)

We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalyzable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgments in which they occur. So far we are in agreement with the absolutists. But, unlike the absolutists, we are able to give an explanation of this fact about ethical [ethics] concepts. We say that the reason why they are unanalyzable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. **The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.** Thus **if I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” I am not stating anything more than** if I had simply said, **“You stole that money,” in a peculiar tone of horror, or** written it with the addition of some special **exclamation marks.** The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that **the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker**. If now I generalize my previous statement and say, “Stealing money is wrong,” I produce **[producing] a statement which has no factual meaning**—that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is if I had written “Stealing money!!”—where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false. **Another** man [person] **may disagree with me** about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my moral sentiments. **But** he **[she] cannot,** strictly speaking, **contradict me. For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong**, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. **I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments**. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a general proposition. What we have just been saying about the symbol “wrong” applies to all normative ethical symbols. Sometimes they occur in sentences which record ordinary empirical facts besides expressing ethical feeling about those facts: sometimes they occur in sentences which simply express ethical feeling about a certain type of action, or situation, without making any statement of fact. But **in every case [of]** in which one would commonly be said to be making an **ethical judgment, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely “emotive.”** It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but **not to make any assertion about them.**

Thus, ethical judgments are only reflective of our emotional feelings. This means that morality escapes notions of truth and falsity as an unanalyzable concept.

**Ayer 2**, (Alfred Jules, Language, Truth, and Logic: Critique of Ethics and Theology, p. 107-112, 1946, JD)

We can now see why **it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity of ethical judgments.** It is not because they have an “absolute” validity which is mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but **because they have no objective validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false.** And we have seen that sentences which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. **They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable—because they do not express genuine propositions.**

This means the aff can never proactively prove the resolution as valid since ethical judgments only are an expression of feeling, not factual concepts.

Skep Good

1. I meet—skep is no more insufficient than a link turn: if they beat back the link turn, they don’t win; they just don’t lose. There is no brightline to when my argument becomes necessary but insufficient compared to a turn, and their interp assumes that there is one. This analysis needed to be in the interp, since now they get a 2AR to cover their mistake at no cost.
2. I meet—CX checks your ability to ask the status of my arguments, I would have granted artificial sufficiency, you just had to say the magic words.
3. I meet—NC is sufficient since all arguments link to the necessary and sufficient standards of permissibility, the text of the resolution, and the concept of truth.
4. I meet—you get discursive turn ground—let’s be real, the NC ignores the plight of billions of people suffering around the world—that’s a turn that precludes the NC which outweighs any claim to ground loss or reciprocity.
5. NC takes out theory—they’ve conceded the text of skepticism which means that any normative statement has no causal grounding. Their interp makes a normative claim in that we ought to promote a certain norm for debate, but if statements lack truth value, their interp is denied.
6. Counter-interpretation—The aff may not deny the neg’s ability to disprove a stable ethical system via skepticism or any argument that denies the existence of morality.
7. Standards
   1. Philosophical ground- skep allows interaction on a framework level so my interp increases education that otherwise wouldn’t have come up. This is especially warranted since the main goal of philosophy is to escape skepticism, so to disprove your framework is to advocate skep. This also links to fairness since it’s the only way for me to challenge a metaethical standard, otherwise they would have free reign over ignoring any number of key assumptions with their moral theory. This outweighs your topical arguments since if I can’t challenge your framing, I can’t engage in the interaction in the first place. I have the strongest link to education as the only standard contextualized to the purpose of LD to value clash between modes of thought.

Philosophy has the strongest link to education and is a prerequisite to other voters— contemplation of thought itself is necessary to give value to real world activities and answer why we care about other things in the first place.

**Russell,** (Bertrand, the Value of Philosophy, <http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus15.html>)

The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. **The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense**, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. **Philosophy**, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to **suggest[s] many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom.** Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, **and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.** Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, **philosophy’s** has a value -- perhaps its **chief value [is] through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation.** The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in comparison with which the philosophic life is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the whole outer world, **we remain like a garrison in a beleagured fortress,** knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that ultimate surrender is inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but **a constant strife between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will.** In one way or another, **if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife.**

And, I control the internal link to topic specific and real world education—philosophy frames those mindsets, is necessary in the professional world and key to argumentation itself.

**Rice 1**, (Rice University’s Philosophy Department in Houston, Texas, Why Study Philosophy, <http://philosophy.rice.edu/content.aspx?id=80>, JD)

Philosophy has a reputation for being otherworldly and impractical -- some say "philosophy butters no bread." But it doesn't really deserve these labels. The purpose of **philosophy** is controversial, but at least one thing it **involves is the construction and evaluation of arguments**. The study of philosophy provides a training in expressing thoughts clearly and precisely, in **defending one's ideas**, and in **evaluating the positions of others**. Quite simply, philosophy gives **[and] training in critical thinking. And this is a skill valuable in any professional field.** Philosophy has a special affinity with the legal profession, in which argument and the application of general rules to cases play central roles. Many law schools recognize this connection, and are especially receptive to philosophy majors. But philosophical skills are valuable elsewhere as well. In business **you must be able to formulate** and clarify **problems, to analyze** potential **solutions, and defend your approach in a clear and rational way. All these abilities are improved by exercise in philosophical argument.** And finally, medical schools place increasing importance on the ability to reflect on the ethical issues that arise in their practice -- and these are problems treated in moral philosophy.

Off reciprocity/time skew:

1. Turn—they get access to turning the ground skepticism relies on, like if it affirms or negates, which would preclude my arguments and function as a voter for them, meaning their turn-ground is better.
2. Not true- they could turn my argument to say that moral facts are always true using something like Dionysian ethics - the response at least exists.
3. Turn—since the textuality of error theory is going conceded, their interp requires you to modify the resolution after the AC, which skews my ground since I already read the case assuming the topic as written. Also, this functions as an additional deficit to predictability, since the resolution is the only predictable limit, outweighing ground since we need opportunities to prepare ways to use it at all.

Off clash:

1. Turn—my interp increases clash because interaction occurs at both a contention and framing level—I force you to defend the assumptions your framework makes.
2. Nothing unique about turns that get you more education. You can make defensive arguments against my position which still garner the same educational benefit, so this is terminal defense on the internal link.

Education comes first:

* + 1. It’s the only portable goal of the activity. I won’t remember the abuse in one round but the knowledge will last a lifetime.
    2. Education is the only thing that gives debate value. We don’t value equality for anything other than their facilitating educational discussion, which makes fairness at best an internal link to education, but I outweigh since I have a direct causal link and because nothing about their disadvantage would keep them from engaging my position.
    3. Not unique to debate -- If you want a fair activity, go play board games. As a judge you should only evaluate what is the better model of debate.

Don’t evaluate theory:

1. There’s no reason to vote on theoretical issues—it doesn’t function as a check to abuse as people either get good at answering theory or just ignore the loss and continue to run the same arguments the next round. I either didn’t find my argument theoretically abusive and therefore probably still disagree, or I knew it was theoretically abusive and ran it anyway—you’re not changing anything.
2. We learn to use “education” and “fairness” as emergency buttons and we lose touch of what they actually mean. Theory is used as a competitive argument to gain an advantage, and it conveniently has a tendency to make the same kinds of strategic moves it criticizes. IE establishing a NIB by saying RVI’s bad and requiring a loss of substance through arguing for competing interpretations.

If you do, it’s an RVI—if I win offense or an I meet, vote neg:

1. Deters bad theory debates—common strats now include 7 or 8 interps which muddle the round into minute weighing completely devoid of substance—the only way to ensure better topical rounds in the future is to set a precedent disincentivizing shitty ones with no violation.
2. I had to waste a bunch of time in the NR developing responses since theory’s a game over issue. Cross apply the conceded C subpoint under presumption—the aff is ahead on 1AR theory so the only reciprocal option is to allow bidirectional access to the ballot.